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Knowledge about genetic data – as a biological determinant of the psy-
chophysical characteristics of a human being, and which is linked to the 
development of human genome mapping programmes – raises questions 
about the direction of legal policy in the field of international biomedi-
cal law and domestic legal systems. These issues are also addressed in 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.1 Through the ap-
plication of its dynamic approach to the interpretation of the Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Court has begun to 
outline a new perception of the right to respect for privacy which en-
ables the protection of human genetic data. Bearing this in mind, the aim 
of this paper is to analyze the European Court of Human Rights’ case 
law on genetic information in the scope of international biomedical stan-
dards expressed in both the International Declaration on Human Genetic 
Data and the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Hu-
man Dignity in the Field of Application of Biology and Medicine. 
International Standards for the 
Protection of Genetic Data
International standards for the protection of genetic data are reflected 
in the provisions of the International Declaration on Human Genetic 
1 Hereinafter: the European Court of Human Rights or the Court.
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Data adopted at UNESCO’s General Conference on the 16th of October 
20032, and the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dig-
nity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine adopted by on the 4th of April 1997.3 
The International Declaration on Human Genetic Data regulates 
“the collection, processing, use and storage of human genetic data, hu-
man proteomic data and of the biological samples from which they are 
derived in keeping with the requirements of equality, justice and solidar-
ity, while giving due consideration to freedom of thought and expres-
sion, including freedom of research.”4 By granting a special status to hu-
man genetic data, the Declaration emphasises its characteristics, which 
consist of the following: the ability to define individuals’ genetic predis-
positions, the ability to influence human offspring, a cultural dimension, 
and a special status since these data may contain information whose 
significance only becomes apparent as a result of a genetic test. For 
these reasons, the Declaration calls upon the international community 
to protect both genetic data and the biological samples from which the 
said data are derived, and establishes provisions to define the purposes 
and procedures for its collection, processing, use and storage. In particu-
lar, these provisions cover diagnostics, health care, scientific research, 
forensic medicine and legal proceedings. The Declaration also allows 
for other purposes of collection, processing, use and storage than those 
enumerated in its text, establishing a condition of compliance with its 
provisions and the international human rights system. Those exception-
al purposes and procedures relating to the use of human genetic data 
and proteomic data must comply with ethical standards, and the policy 
pursued in this respect should take into account the views expressed by 
2 The International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, adopted by the General Conference 
of UNESCO on 16 October 2003, SHS/EST/BIO/06/1. Hereinafter: DHGD.
3 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine adopted on the 4th of April 1997, CETS 
no.164. Hereinafter: CHRB.
4 Art. 1. DHGD.
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society. Ethical committees play an important role in this policy: these 
institutions – operating at national, regional, local and institutional lev-
els – have been assigned the role of consultants to express their opinions 
in the process of regulating the handling and use of human genetic, pro-
teomic and biological data in specific projects.
The condition for taking actions involving human genetic data is 
the consent of the person concerned. This consent must be expressed 
in an informed, voluntary and direct manner, after the person has been 
informed of the purpose of the collection, processing, use and storage 
of the data, the consequences associated with these activities, and the 
possibility of withdrawing consent at any stage of the procedure. Fol-
lowing the model of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights5, the International Declaration on Human Genetic 
Data also allows for an exception to this principle, involving reasons of 
major importance to the health of the person concerned, in the absence 
of the ability to give informed consent. The Declaration states that this 
interference shall be determined by national law and must be in accor-
dance with the international system for the protection of human rights, 
while taking into account the overriding nature of the interests of the 
individual. These are the right to decide whether or not to receive in-
formation on test results, and the right to seek professional advice when 
considering the possibility of undergoing genetic testing. In principle, 
it is therefore prohibited to deny an individual access to their own data. 
However, this condition does not apply in the case of an irreversible 
disconnection from an identifiable source, or circumstances constituting 
a threat to national health, public order or security.
The Declaration obliges States to take steps to protect the privacy of 
genetic data by establishing domestic laws that are compatible with the 
international human rights system. In this context, it formulates a set of 
directives which encompass:
5 The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly on the 11th Of November 1997, A/Res/53/152.
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 – a prohibition on disclosing human genetic data, proteomic data 
or biological samples linked to an identifiable person to third par-
ties, or rendering these data or samples accessible to them6,
 – the requirement not to link human genetic data, proteomic data or 
biological samples collected for scientific research purposes to 
an identifiable person, with the exception of cases where this is 
essential for the nature of the research, while simultaneously en-
suring the protection of the privacy of these data and restricting 
their period of storage to the essential minimum7,
 – the requirement for persons and organizational units responsi-
ble for the processing of both data and biological samples to en-
sure their accuracy, credibility, security and quality.8
The framework of international cooperation in the field of the circula-
tion of human genetic data, proteomic data and biological samples is 
specified in the following requirements: 
 – the requirement for States to regulate the circulation of human 
genetic data, proteomic data and biological samples in accor-
dance with domestic and international legislation, and in a man-
ner ensuring fair access to these data9,
 – the requirement for States to make every effort with regard to 
fostering the international dissemination of scientific knowledge 
related to human genetic data and proteomic data10,
 – the requirement for scientists to make every effort towards es-
tablishing collaboration with regard to human genetic data and 
proteomic data, subject to the restrictions expressed in this 
Declaration.11
6 Art. 14 (b) DHGD.
7 Art. 14 (c) (d) DHGD.
8 Art. 15. DHGD.
9 Art. 18 (a) DHGD.
10 Art. 14 (b) DHGD.
11 Art. 14 (c) DHGD.
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This cooperation is linked to the obligation to share the results of scien-
tific research using human genetic, proteomic and biological data with 
both citizens and the international community, subject to the restrictions 
laid down by national legislation and international agreements. Exam-
ples of ways of achieving this cooperation12 are:
 – establishing forms of special assistance provided to individual 
persons and groups participating in the research;
 – guaranteeing access to medical care;
 – using the research results to ensure new diagnostic methods, 
means of treatment, and medicines; 
 – providing support for health services;
 – providing research assistance for developing countries;
 – other forms of action in keeping with the principles of this 
Declaration.
Selected provisions of the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights 
and Human Dignity in the Field of Application of Biology and Medicine13, 
which regulates the relationship between human rights and the practical 
dimension of the functioning of biological and medical sciences14, are de-
voted to genetic data. This Convention protects human genetic data by 
distinguishing health information connected with the right to respect for 
private life and the right to information. Within the scope of the latter, the 
Convention provides human genome protection that combines: a prohibi-
tion of genetic discrimination, certain restrictions on genetic testing, cer-
12 Art. 19 DHGD.
13  V. CHRB; M. Grzymkowska, Standardy bioetyczne w prawie europejskim, Warszawa 
2009; A. Krajewska, Informacja genetyczna a zakres autonomii jednostki w europejskiej 
przestrzeni prawnej, Wrocław 2008; O. Nawrot, Ludzka biogeneza w standardach bioetycz-
nych Rady Europy, Warszawa 2011, J. Symonides, Międzynarodowe instrumenty prawne 
w dziedzinie bioetyki i biotechnologii, in: Prawa człowieka wobec rozwoju biotechnologii, 
ed. L. Kondratiewa-Bryzik, K. Sękowska-Kozłowska, Warszawa 2013, p. 30.
14 The Convention regulates consent for an intervention in the health field, private life and 
right to information, human genome, scientific research, organ and tissue removal from 
living donors for transplantation purposes and the prohibition of financial gain and the 
disposal of a part of the human body.
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tain restrictions on intervention in the human genome, and a prohibition 
on using techniques of medically assisted procreation for the purpose of 
sex selection, except in the case of serious hereditary sex-related disease.
Genetic Data Protection in the Scope 
of the Interpretation of Article 8  
of the Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms
There are echoes of violations that come from the practical dimen-
sion of the biomedical sciences in the individual applications di-
rected to the Court. In considering the allegations raised in them, the 
Court has interpreted the provisions of the Convention, guided by 
the dynamics of changes taking place in the modern social structure. 
Those changes cover: reproductive rights15, medically assisted procre-
ation16, surrogate motherhood17, euthanasia18, consent to be treated19, 
15 The authors of the research report on Bioethics and the case-law of the Court lists the fol-
lowing examples of case-law on reproductive rights: Draon v. France, no. 1513/03, judg-
ment of 6 October 2005; D. v. Ireland, no. 26499/02, decision of 27 June 2006; Tysiąc 
v. Poland, no. 5410/03, judgment of 20 March 2007.
16 The authors of the research report on Bioethics and the case-law of the Court lists the follow-
ing examples of case-law on medically assisted procreation: Evans v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 6339/05, judgment of 10 April 2007; Dickson v. the United Kingdom, no. 44362/04, judgment 
of 4 December 2007; S.H and Others v. Austria, no. 57813/00, judgment of 3 November 2011.
17 The authors of the research report on Bioethics and the case-law of the Court lists the 
following examples of case-law on surrogate motherhood: D. and Others v. Belgium, 
no. 29176/13, decision of 8 July 2014; Mennesson v. France, no. 65192/11, judgment of 
26 June 2014 and Labassee v. France, no. 65941/11, judgment of 26 June 2014; Foulon 
and Bouvet v. France, no. 9063/14 and 10410/14, judgment of 21 July 2016; Paradiso and 
Campanelli v. Italy, no. 25358/12, judgment of 27 January 2015.
18 The authors of the research report on Bioethics and the case-law of the Court lists the fol-
lowing examples of euthanasia case-law: Koch v Germany, no. 497/09, judgment of 19 July 
2012; Gross v. Switzerland, no. 67810/10, judgment of 30 September 2014.
19 The authors of the research report on Bioethics and the case-law of the Court lists the 
following examples of case-law on a consent to be treated: Glass v. the United Kingdom, 
no. 61827/00, judgment of 9 March 2004; Jalloh v. Germany, no. 54810/00, judgment of 
11 July 2006; M.A.K. and R.K. v. the United Kingdom, no. 45901/05 and 40146/06, judg-
ment of 23 March 2010.
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transgender20, storage of fingerprints, biological data and genetic pro-
file21, as well as biological identity.22 When examining the selected cas-
es, the Court pays attention to the right to life, the prohibition of torture, 
the right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial, the right to re-
spect for private and family life, the prohibition of discrimination and 
the protection of property, by reinterpreting the meaning of Articles 2, 3, 
5, 6, 8, 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of its first Protocol.
Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms23 guarantees the right to respect for the private spheres 
of life by protecting individuals from arbitrary interference from the State 
authorities. The Convention divides the private sphere of life into four cat-
egories, by distinguishing: private life, family life, home and correspon-
dence. The article is composed of two paragraphs. The first one guarantees 
to everyone “the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.”24 The second is regarded as a limitation clause and states 
that” there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”25 
20 The authors of the research report on Bioethics and the case-law of the Court lists the following 
examples of case-law on transgender: Y.Y. v. Turkey, no. 14793/08, judgment of 10 March 2015. 
21 The authors of the research report on Bioethics and the case-law of the Court lists the follow-
ing examples of case-law on storage of fingerprints, biological data and genetic profile: S. and 
Marper v. United Kingdom, no. 30562/04 and 30566/04, judgement of 4 December 2008.
22 The authors of the research report on Bioethics and the case-law of the Court lists the fol-
lowing examples of case-law on biological identity: Jäggi v. Switzerland, no. 58757/00, 
judgment of 13 July 2006.
 Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, no. 23890/02, judgment of 20 December 2007; Darmon v. Poland, 
no. 7802/05, decision of 17 November 2009; Gronmark v. Finland, no. 17038/04, judgment 
of 6 July 2010; Backlund v. Finland, no. 36498/05, judgment of 6 July 2010.
23 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms adopted 4 No-
vember 1950, ETS 5, 213 UNTS 222, Hereinafter: ECHR.
24 Art. 8 (1) ECHR.
25 Art. 8 (2) ECHR.
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The way in which the distinguished areas are interpreted determines 
the content of the rights guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention.26 
The first of the selected categories – private life – escapes the defini-
tional framework. From this reason the Court reconstructs the meaning 
of a private life, by identifying cases that fall within its scope. This activ-
ity involves a dynamic approach to the interpretation of the Convention, 
which allows for the possibility of extending the scope of protection 
granted to the sphere of private life. Its framework is subordinated to the 
idea of the psychophysical integrity of the human person, accompanied 
by a guarantee of individual autonomy. This idea is implemented in:
 – the protection of personal identity: name, origin, gender and sex-
ual orientation 
 – the prohibition of discrimination27,
 – the prohibition of the arbitrary interference in physical, psycho-
logical and moral integrity28,
 – the protection of honour and reputation29,
 – standards of data and information protection30, 
 – the right to the environment.31 
The second of the selected spheres of personal autonomy concerns the 
family.32 The relationship between family members in their social, cul-
tural, moral and material status is protected by the Convention.33 The 
notion of the family applies to both formally established ties and factual 
relationships.34 Family life covers three fields of interpersonal relations. 
26 W. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights. A Commentary, New York 2017, 
pp. 369–388.
27 L. Garlicki, Komentarz do art. 8, in: Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych 
Wolności. Komentarz do artykułów 1–18, ed. L. Garlicki, I, Warszawa 2010, pp. 493–499.
28 Ibidem, pp. 499–500.
29 Ibidem, pp. 500–506.
30 Ibidem, pp. 506–507.
31 Ibidem, pp. 508–518.
32 W. Schabas, The European Convention…, pp. 388–400.
33 Merger and Cros v. France, no. 68864/01, judgement of 22 December 2004.
34 Marckx v. Belgium, no. 6833/74, judgement of 13 June 1979.
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The first one concerns marriage. The second is related to the relationship 
between parents and children. The third, in turn, includes situations of 
special subordination, concerning persons deprived of their liberty and 
foreigners. Besides respect for private and family life, Article 8 of the 
Convention protects the home and correspondence.35 The term ‘home’ is 
interpreted within the scope of the term domicile used in the French ver-
sion of the Convention.36 Under this interpretation, Article 8 protects not 
only the physical place of residence where an individual conducts their 
private or family life, but also professional and commercial premises. 
Both natural and legal persons are entitled to exercise the right to respect 
for their “home”, which extends to the protection of correspondence 
as well. The concept of correspondence covers both electronic and tra-
ditional forms of mail. The case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights illustrates what the term correspondence is intended to cover:
 – traditional forms of mail communication37, 
 – the technical form of text messages38,
 – forms of sending messages via private devices39,
 – forms of sending messages via public devices40,
 – the sending of messages by a person subject to an extraordinary 
form of subordination.41
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights stipulates the 
meaning of the selected forms of communication and enumerates the list 
of restrictions allowed by the Convention that can be imposed by public 
authorities. 
35 W. Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights. A Commentary, New York 2017, 
pp. 400–401.
36 L. Garlicki, Komentarz do art. 8, in: Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podsta-
wowych Wolności. Komentarz do artykułów 1–18, ed. L. Garlicki, I, Warszawa 2010, p. 537.
37 Ibidem, s. 542. 
38 Weber and Saravia v. Germany, no. 54934/00, decision of 29 June 2006.
39 Halford v. United Kingdom, no. 20605/92, judgement of 25 June 1997.
40 Ibidem.
41 Golder v. United Kingdom, no. 4451/70, judgement of 21 February 1975.
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Analysing the scope of right to respect for private and family life, 
Marek Antoni Nowicki points out that protection of individuals from 
arbitrary interference combines both negative and positive dimensions 
of the obligation.42 The former concerns the prohibition of actions that 
might violate human autonomy. The latter obliges States Parties to the 
Convention to establish the means to protect individuals’ private lives. 
This positive dimension of the obligation is implied by the nature of 
the distinguished spheres of private life, the individual’s position, 
and the State’s practice that shapes its context. Its analysis is determined 
by the rule of law principle.43 The status of the Convention as a living in-
strument44 allows for a dynamic approach to the interpretation of its pro-
visions in judicial practice, which makes extending the meaning of the 
right to respect for private and family life possible. This interpretation 
is in compliance with the set of conditions expressed in the Judgment 
of the Court of 7 December 1976 in the Case of Handyside v. United 
Kingdom.45 These conditions demand a special protection of the rights 
guaranteed by the provisions of Articles 8,9,10 and 11 of the Conven-
tion, justified by their fundamental role for the functioning of demo-
cratic society.46 With this justification comes the necessity ascribing 
certain limitations to the forms of interference. These are related to the 
exceptional status of these actions, which might be used only on a par-
ticular occasion. As William Schabas points out: “the definition of the 
right in the first paragraph of Article 8 is complemented by a second 
paragraph that restricts or limits the scope of the right.”47 “In its ap-
plication of Article 8, the Court first proceeds to consider whether there 
has been an interference with a right within the scope of paragraph 1. 
It then, as a general rule examines the criteria set out in paragraph 2 in 
42 M.A. Nowicki, Wokół Konwencji Europejskiej. Komentarz do Europejskiej Konwencji 
Praw Człowieka, Warszawa 2017.
43 Ibidem.
44 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, no. 5856/72, judgement of 2 April 1978, § 73. 
45 Handyside v. United Kingdom, no. 5493/72, judgement of 7 December 1976.
46 Ibidem. 
47 W. Schabas, The European Convention…, p. 367.
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order to determine whether the interference is also the violation of the 
Convention”.48 When examining the selected premises, the Court an-
swers the question of whether interference was in accordance with law 
and necessary in a democratic society. The objective of the first clause 
is to consider whether interference is authorized by a rule recognized 
in the national legal order, accessible and foreseeable and “subject to 
mechanisms so that it can be applied to in a manner that is genuine 
and not arbitrary.”49 The objective of the second clause it to “consider 
whether the authorities have struck ‘a fair balance between the compet-
ing interests of the individual and of society as a whole’50.”51
To reconstruct the meaning and scope of the application of genetic 
data protection it is necessary to pay attention to the element of Ar-
ticle 8 of the Convention which guarantees the respect for private life. 
The Court analyzed this in the decision in the Van der Velden v. Neth-
erlands case of 7 December 200652 and the Judgement in the S. and 
Marper v. United Kingdom case from 4 December 2008.53 In declaring 
the inadmissibility of the Van der Velden application, the Court held that 
the collection of biological samples and human genetic data of a con-
victed person could not be regarded as a form of criminal penalty under 
Article 7 of the Convention. This view is supported by the observations 
on the possibility of limiting the right to data protection of a convicted 
person in the case of crimes of a certain degree of seriousness, when 
establishing general principles of collecting biological samples in order 
to determine a genetic profile. The Court was of the opinion that if such 
interference to be allowed, must be – interpreted within the scope of 
Article 8 of the Convention – “in accordance with law” and “necessary 
in a democratic society”.
48 Ibidem, p. 367. 
49 Ibidem, p. 403.
50 Keegan v. Ireland, no. 16969/90, Judgement of 26 May 1994.
51 W. Schabas, The European Convention…, p. 406.
52 Van der Velden v. Netherlands, no. 29514/05, decision of 7 December 2006. 
53 S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, no. 30562/04 and 30566/04, judgement of 4 December 
2008.
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The Court’s declaration expressed in the Van der Velden case is re-
flected in its case law. When considering S. and Marper v. United King-
dom, the Court paid attention to the regulations concerning storing finger-
print samples and DNA profiles.54 Holding that there had been a violation 
of Article 8 of the Convention, the Grand Chamber of the Court confirmed 
that genetic data protection falls within the scope of application of the 
right to respect for private life. According to the issued judgment, the stor-
age of these data after the end of criminal proceedings by an acquittal or 
remission violates the right guaranteed in Art. 8 of the Convention. 
In 2001 Mr. S. and Mr. Marper were accused of committing crimes. 
Mr. S. was charged with attempted robbery, while Mr. Marper was 
charged with harassment of his partner. Both applicants’ fingerprints and 
DNA samples were taken during the criminal proceedings. The first case 
ended with a judgment of acquittal. In the second one the Crown Prose-
cution Service served a notice of discontinuance. After the proceedings 
had ended, both applicants asked for their fingerprints and DNA samples 
to be destroyed. Both applications were refused, so the applicants applied 
for a judicial review. On the 22 March 2002 the Administrative Court 
rejected the application. Its judgement was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeal and then two years later by the House of Lords. The justification 
for the refusal comes with the interpretation of Article 64 (1A) of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 198455, which regulates the storage 
of biological samples and fingerprints after the criminal procedure is 
over. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 allows the storage 
54 There are several comments on the Judgement in the S. and Marper v. United Kingdom case 
in the legal scholarly papers: L. Heffernan, DNA and fingerprint data retention: S and Marper 
v UK, “European Law Review” 2009, no. 34(3), pp. 491–504; J. Kapelańska-Pręgowska, In-
formacja genetyczna jako kategoria chronionych danych osobowych. Uwagi na tle orzecznic-
twa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka, in: Między wykładnią a tworzeniem prawa. 
Refleksje na tle orzecznictwa Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka i międzynarodowych 
trybunałów karnych, eds C. Mik, M. Gałka, Toruń 2011; A. Peterson, S. And Marper v. United 
Kingdom: the European Court of Human Rights Overturs the UK’s Procedure for the Indefi-
nite Retention of Unconvicted Person’s Personal Data, “Tulane Journal of International & 
Comparative Law” 2010, vol. 18, issue 2, pp. 557–572. 
55 Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, 1984 p. 60.
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of fingerprints and DNA samples in the database of the investigative 
bodies for the purpose of prevention, detection, preparatory proceed-
ings and prosecution, even if the aim for which they were obtained has 
already been achieved and the criminal procedure has been completed. 
The application of Article 64 (1A) of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act also covered the samples of Mr. S. and Mr. Marper.
The applicants filed complaints under Articles 8 and 14 of the Con-
vention, alleging that the authorities had interfered with their right to 
respect for private and family life by continuing to retain their finger-
prints and DNA profiles in an unjustified way, which could be regard-
ed as a form of discrimination. In its reply to applications 30562/04 
and 30566/04, the United Kingdom recalled the public interest that the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984 serves. When examining 
the applications, however, the Court decided that there had been a vio-
lation of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court held that it was not 
necessary to examine the complaint under Article 14 of the Convention 
separately. The Court’s conclusion was as follows:
The blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of the fin-
gerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not 
convicted of offences, as applied in the case of the present applicants, fails to 
strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and 
that the respondent State has overstepped any acceptable margin of appre-
ciation in this regard. Accordingly, the retention at issue constitutes a dispro-
portionate interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private life 
and cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.56
In its assessment, the Court made a distinction between cellular samples 
containing genetic data and fingerprints. The concept of the protection 
of genetic information analyzed within the scope of the application of 
56 S. and Marper v. United Kingdom, no. 30562/04 and 30566/04, judgement of 4 December 
2008.
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Article 8 of the Convention leads to an argument devoted to the issue 
of genetic data. In this regard, in order to determine whether there had 
been a violation of the right guaranteed in Article 8 of the Convention, 
the Court emphasized the importance of the individual’s concerns about 
the potential future use of this data. The Court emphasized the role of 
personal data that is stored in a cellular sample, indicating that its stor-
age constitutes an interference with private life. This must be examined 
within the scope of the broader perspective, referring not only to the 
donor of the biological material, but also to persons with a genetic rela-
tionship with them. Furthermore, the Court noted that information about 
a person’s ethnicity can be determined from genetic data. For these rea-
sons the Grand Chamber of the Court drew the conclusion that the stor-
age of genetic data needs to meet the requirement of proportionality and 
be subjected to a time regime restriction.
The conception of genetic data protection was developed in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the Van der Velden 
v. The Netherlands and S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom cases. 
In the scope of that interpretation, the aim of Article 8 is to protect both 
genetic data and biological samples that allow the donor’s profile to be 
known. When examining applications, the Court focuses on both formal 
and material premises to assess if the conduct of the public authori-
ties interferes the sphere of private life. If interference is identified, the 
next step is to examine if it is “in accordance with law” and “necessary 
in a democratic society”. The Court assumes that the Convention allows 
such interference when it finds its justification in the goal of the criminal 
proceedings or the DNA profile database, noting the necessity of a time 
regime restriction. 
In determining the scope of protection of genetic data, the Court 
interprets Article 8 of the Convention through a comparative juxtaposi-
tion of standards of international human rights law57, European Union 
57 The European Court of Human Rights recalls both regional and universal standards of inter-
national law: United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, United Nations 
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law58, the national law of Member States59, and the case law of the Su-
preme Court of Canada.60 The first point of the comparison focuses on 
Article 40 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
The Council of Europe Convention of 1981 for the protection of individ-
uals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, Recommen-
dation No. R (87) 15 of the Committee of Ministers regulating the use 
of personal data in the police sector and Recommendation No. R (92) 1 
of the Committee of Ministers on the use of analysis of deoxyribonucle-
ic acid (DNA) within the framework of the criminal justice system. The 
second draws on Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data. The third concerns the regulation of the use of genetic data in 
criminal proceedings of selected Member States of the Council of Eu-
rope. Lastly, the fourth considers the decision in R v. R. C., in which the 
Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the storage of a minor’s genetic data 
in a DNA database was unduly intrusive and stressed the disproportion-
ate nature of such a measure. In this comparative overview, however, the 
Court does not refer to the provisions of the International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data or to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application 
of Biology and Medicine. Thus, any attempt to assess the way in which 
the protection of genetic data is defined in terms of the biomedical stan-
Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3; The Council of Europe Convention of 1981 for the protection of 
individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, ETS no. 108, 28.01.1981; Rec-
ommendation no. R (87) 15 of the Committee of Ministers regulating the use of personal data 
in the police sector and Recommendation no. R (92) 1 of the Committee of Ministers on the use 
of analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid DNA within the framework of the criminal justice system.
58 Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data provides that the object 
of national laws on the processing of personal data, Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 
P. 0031–0050.
59 The European Court of Human Rights lists the following examples of states with a limited 
DNA taking procedures: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain and Sweden.
60 R. v. R.C., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 99, 2005 SCC 61
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dards encoded in these documents requires a separate analysis. The In-
ternational Declaration on Human Genetic Data lists forensic medicine 
and civil, criminal and other legal proceedings as the valid purposes 
for collecting, processing, using and storing human genetic data.61 The 
Declaration links the collection of biological samples “for the purposes 
of forensic medicine or in civil, criminal and other legal proceedings” 
to the requirements of domestic law that are consistent with the interna-
tional human rights law.62 The declaration also regulates, in an analogous 
way, the storage of biological samples which are used to obtain genetic 
data during ongoing proceedings.63 Human genetic data, proteomic data 
and biological samples can be made available for forensic medicine and 
civil proceedings only until the end of the proceedings, unless otherwise 
provided by domestic law consistent with international human rights 
law.64 Although those provisions were not cited in the Marper and S. v. 
United Kingdom judgment, the Court relies on a comparison between 
the legal system of the United Kingdom and the examples of legisla-
tion in force in the Member States of the Council of Europe in order to 
demonstrate the extent to which DNA databases in the UK fall short of 
the standards laid down for the protection of personal data. The Court 
observes that these regulations introduce restrictions on the collection 
of genetic data which are lacking in the British legal system. The Court 
also draws attention to the status of genetic information, and the posi-
tion it adopts in this respect corresponds with the way genetic data is 
characterised in the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, 
which draws attention to the possibilities of the use of genetic data in 
the future that are linked to the development of human genome mapping 
programmes.65 Indeed, these data serve not only to identify and single 
out individuals, but also constitute a source of health information that 
61 Art. 5 DHGD.
62 Art. 12 DHGD.
63 Art. 17 DHGD.
64 Art. 21 DHGD.
65 Art. 4 DHGD.
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remains under the protection of Article 11 of the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to 
the Application of Biology and Medicine.66 
The conception of genetic data protection was developed in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the Van der Velden 
v. The Netherlands and S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom cases. 
In its scope, the aim of Article 8 is to protect both genetic data and 
biological samples that allow the donor’s profile to be known. When 
examining applications, the Court focuses on both formal and material 
premises to assess if the public authorities’ conduct interferes the sphere 
of private life. If interference is identified, the next step is to examine if 
it is “in accordance with law” and “necessary in a democratic society”. 
The Court assumes that the Convention allows such interference when 
it finds its justification in the goal of the criminal proceedings or the 
DNA profile database, noting the necessity of a time regime restriction. 
Although the Court does not explicitly cite the provisions of Interna-
tional Declaration on Human Genetic Data or the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with re-
gard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, its position can be 
seen to be compatible with with the norms of international biomedical 
law encoded in these documents. These provisions leave the states of the 
international community a margin of discretion in regulating the method 
of taking biological samples, storing genetic data, and destroying bio-
logical samples, while ensuring that information about health remains 
a part of private life. The limits of this freedom are to be determined by 
international law.
66 Art. 11 CHRB.
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SUMMARY
European Court of Human Rights Case Law on Genetic 
Information in the Scope of International Biomedical Law
The aim of the study is to analyze the case law of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights on genetic information in the scope of international biomedical 
law, as expressed in the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
and the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Human Dignity 
in the Field of Application of Biology and Medicine. The Court held that the 
genetic information is protected under the law of the Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The model of the right to respect for 
private life is reflected in its shape, as the Court noted in the Van der Velden 
v. The Netherlands and S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom cases. It leads 
to the conclusion that the provision of Article 8 of the Convention provides 
the protection of genetic information, subject to certain restrictions that are 
“in accordance with law” and “necessary in a democratic society”. Such 
conclusion is in compliance with art. 12, art. 17 (b) art. 21 (c) of the Inter-
national Declaration on Human Genetic Data, and art. 11 of the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine.
Keywords: genetic data protection, the right to respect for private life, 
international biomedical law, European Court of Human Rights case law.
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